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ETHICAL QUANDARIES: THE HOLOCAUST 
EXPROPRIATED ART RECOVERY ACT AND 
CLAIMS FOR WORKS IN PUBLIC MUSEUMS 
CHARLES CRONIN† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2016 agents from United States Homeland Security 
Investigations stopped by Craig Gilmore’s house in Los Angeles 
to determine whether he owned a painting by the seventeenth-
century artist Melchior Geldorp.1  The picture they were seeking, 
Portrait of a Lady, had been owned by the National Museum in 
Warsaw, but had disappeared when the Nazis demolished the 
city after the Uprising of 1944 toward the end of WWII.2 
Since 1992, the Polish Ministry of Culture has been 
gathering and publicizing information on cultural property that 
disappeared from Poland during WWII.3  The Geldorp picture 
was included in the Ministry’s Catalogue of Wartime Losses.  
Polish authorities ultimately traced it to Doyle’s, an auction 
house in New York.4  In 2006, Gilmore purchased the painting 
from Doyle’s through an online auction for about $3,400.5  The 
Department of Homeland Security acquired this information 
after the United States agreed to pursue the painting on behalf of 
 
† BM Oberlin; JD American Univ.; MA, PhD Stanford; MIMS Berkeley, Adjunct 
Prof., Keck Graduate Institute, Claremont Colleges; Visiting Scholar George 
Washington Univ. Law School. ccronin@law.gwu.edu. Many thanks to St. John’s 
Law Review members for thoughtful work on this piece.  
1 See Craig Gilmore, Looted by Nazis, Then Seized From My Dining Room, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2016, at A25. Homeland Security Investigations is the investigative 
arm of the Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Investigations, 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.ice.gov/hsi (last visited October 1, 
2018). 
2 See Dep’t of Homeland Security, Restitution Claim – M. Geldorp, Portrait of a 
Lady (on file with author). 
3 See POLISH MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND NATIONAL HERITAGE, DIVISION FOR 
LOOTED ART, http://lootedart.gov.pl/en/ (last visited October 1, 2018). 
4 See Product War Losses, POLISH MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND NATIONAL 
HERITAGE, http://lootedart.gov.pl/en/product-war-losses?ID=13&pN=14 (last visited 
October 1, 2018); see Dep’t of Homeland Security, Restitution Claim – M. Geldorp, 
Portrait of a Lady (on file with author). 
5 See Letter from Laura B. McGill, Purchasing Accounts, Doyle New York, to 
Doyle New York Client (October 26, 2006) (on file with author). 
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the Polish Government.6  On October 11, 2016, Gilmore handed 
over the picture to the agents,7 who told him it would be 
forwarded to the National Museum in Warsaw.8 
Melchior Geldorp was the son of a more prominent Flemish 
painter named Gortzius.9  Paintings by Gortzius, or those 
attributed to him, have commanded prices in the tens of 
thousands of dollars.10  Paintings attributed to Melchior and 
others, identified as “followers” or “circle” of Gortzius, however, 
are typically sold for about a quarter of the price.11 
It is remarkable that the U.S. Government likely spent 
considerably more than the economic value of Gilmore’s picture 
to investigate, acquire, and transport the work at the behest of 
the Polish government.12  This restitution claim is also unusual 
in that it involves a public museum asserting rights to a 
privately owned work.  This differs from most Nazi-era art claims 
to date that have usually involved private parties lodging 
complaints against public museums.13  The unusual 
circumstances surrounding the recent return of the Geldorp 
portrait to a public museum gives rise to the issue this Article 
covers:  whether the status of claimants and defendants in  
 
 
 
6 See Dep’t of Homeland Security, Restitution Claim – M. Geldorp, Portrait of a 
Lady (on file with author). 
7 See Gilmore, supra note 1, at A25. 
8 As of Oct. 12, 2018 the Polish Ministry’s Catalogue of Wartime Losses still 
indicates the work as missing. See Product War Losses, POLISH MINISTRY OF 
CULTURE AND NATIONAL HERITAGE, http://lootedart.gov.pl/en/product-war-
losses?ID=13&pN=14 (last visited October 1, 2018). 
9 See 2 JOHN DENISON CHAMPLIN, JR., CYCLOPEDIA OF PAINTERS AND 
PAINTINGS 120 (1905). 
10 In January 2016 Sotheby’s sold Portrait of an Elegant Woman in the Guise of 
Venus, attributed to Gortzius Geldorp, for $22,500. See Portrait of an Elegant 
Woman in the Guise of Venus, SOTHEBY’S, http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ 
ecatalogue/2016/master-paintings-sculpture-day-sale-n09461/lot.454.html?locale=en 
(last visited October 1, 2018). 
11 In April 2013 Christie’s sold Portrait of a Lady by “[a] follower of Gortzius 
Geldorp” for $5,000—$1,000 below the published low estimate. See Auction Results 
of Portrait of a Lady, Bust Length, in a Lace Collar and Headdress, CHRISTIE’S, 
https://www.christies.com/LotFinder/lot_details.aspx?intObjectID=5669555 (last 
visited October 1, 2018). 
12 The U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Poland also offered to fund a trip from Los 
Angeles to Warsaw for Gilmore and his partner, but later revoked the invitation. See 
E-mails from Craig Gilmore to Author (Jan. 23, 2017, 18:14 PST; Feb. 8, 2017, 13: 41 
PST) (on file with author). 
13 See discussion infra Part III.A and Part III.B. 
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Holocaust-era art claims as public entities or private citizens 
implicates ethical issues that should bear on the disposition of 
these cases, and if so, to what extent. 
Part I considers the origins of these claims during WWII, 
and the temporal legal obstacles they may encounter many years 
after the events that engendered them.  Part II discusses the 
recently enacted Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 
2016 (“HEAR”), which established a national six-year statutory 
limitation period applicable exclusively to claims for artworks 
lost as a result of Nazi expropriation. 
Part II examines specific disputes that are identified in 
HEAR’s text as demonstrating the need for this legislation, and 
also claims purportedly enabled by its subsequent enactment.  
While these disputes have involved temporal defenses, the courts 
adjudicating them have also exhaustively reviewed the factual 
bases of the claims and, in every case, found them deficient.  In 
other words, these claims would fail on their merits alone, 
regardless of the fact that they also involved obstacles based 
upon “legal technicalities.”14  This raises the question whether 
HEAR’s prohibition of temporal defenses may be used, at least in 
part, as a pretext by which to reopen, or affect the disposition of, 
disputes already adjudicated or currently being litigated. 
Most of these claims have targeted works in public 
collections.  Part III considers the public’s role in generating 
value, and thereby an element of public ownership, in artworks 
in museums.  Part IV concludes with the suggestion that, as 
private claimants become increasingly attenuated from forbears 
whose property was appropriated by a genocidal political regime, 
the public interest should progressively bear upon the resolution 
of claims involving works now in the collections of museums and 
other public trusts. 
I. DISPLACEMENT AND RESTITUTION OF HOLOCAUST-ERA ART 
As a youth, Adolf Hitler worked as an amateur artist 
painting hundreds of representational works, primarily 
watercolors, including many landscapes featuring buildings with 
 
14 See Simon J. Frankel & Ethan Forrest, Museums’ Initiation of Declaratory 
Judgment Actions and Assertion of Statutes of Limitations in Response to Nazi-Era 
Art Restitution Claims–A Defense, 23 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 279, 
303–04 (2013) (positing that temporal defenses are not based on “technicalities” and 
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that decisions based on statutes 
of limitations are decisions on the merits). 
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distinctly Germanic architectural features.15  Vienna’s Academy 
of Fine Arts checked Hitler’s ambitions to become a professional 
artist, twice rejecting his applications for admission.16  Despite—
perhaps because of—these snubs from culturally sophisticated 
Vienna, Hitler spent the rest of his life obsessing over 
establishing a colossal art museum housing Europe’s greatest 
artworks in Linz, the provincial Austrian city in which he spent 
his childhood.17 
The museum’s collection was to contain works appropriated 
by the Nazis from public and private collections throughout 
Europe.18  This appropriation was part of the Nazi’s wholesale 
confiscation from their victims, whether governments or 
individuals, of objects of any economic value, particularly 
personal property owned by Jews.19 
By the time Germany surrendered to the Allied forces in 
1945, it had amassed, and secured in remote castles and mines, 
enormous hordes of valuables.  Most significantly, these included 
precious metals and artworks appropriated from families and 
institutions throughout Europe.  At the end of and following the 
 
15 Hitler’s representational style and conventional subjects are worlds apart 
from the styles and subjects of works that were being created by his contemporaries 
in cities like Berlin and Vienna, many of which the Nazis deemed “degenerate.” See 
SHEARER WEST, THE VISUAL ARTS IN GERMANY 1890–1937: UTOPIA AND DESPAIR 
181–203 (2000) (discussing the political and aesthetic notions behind Nazi 
suppression of modern art, and the major exhibition in which it was reviled, held in 
Munich in November 1937). 
16 See Peter Schjeldahl, Hitler as Artist: How Vienna Inspired the Führer’s 
Dreams, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 19, 2002), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2002/08/19/hitler-as-artist (discussing recent exhibitions and publications dealing 
with Hitler’s artistic ambitions). 
17 See HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL 
THE WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF ART 21 (1997). 
18 See generally LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF 
EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994). 
19 See Sarah Gensburger, The Banality of Robbing the Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
17, 2013, at SR8 (“Everything was taken: toys, dishes, family photos, tools, light 
bulbs.”). The Bolshevik’s plundering of private households in Russia approximately 
twenty years earlier has been similarly described: 
From dressing chambers and drawing rooms, Russia’s colossal collections of 
jewelry and precious stones now spilled out onto the streets. As Orlando 
Figes writes, ‘the flea markets of Petrograd and Moscow were filled with 
the former belongings of fallen plutocrats: icons, paintings, carpets, pianos, 
gramophones, samovars, morning coats and ball dresses.’ Family heirlooms 
passed down from generation to generation over centuries now passed 
through the hands of opportunistic strangers, heedless of their emotional 
value. 
SEAN MCMEEKIN, HISTORY’S GREATEST HEIST: THE LOOTING OF RUSSIA BY THE 
BOLSHEVIKS 38 (2009). 
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War, the “Monuments Men,” a mostly American group of art 
historians and museum curators, located and secured these 
treasures.20 
In the Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession 
Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control, 
more commonly known as the “London Declaration” of 1943, the 
Allies agreed not to recognize wartime transfers of property in 
Nazi-occupied countries.21  After the war, this rejection of the 
legality of documented transfers to the Nazis, which were 
typically forced sales or extortions, was the basis of the policies 
established by the Allies in 1945 to handle the vast 
accumulations of artworks and other valuables that the Nazis 
had removed to Germany during the preceding five years.22  
Because the Allies determined that Nazi-era property transfers 
were invalid, the enormous stores of moveable property stored in 
Germany were regarded as stolen assets.23 
Also in 1943, the State Department, anticipating the U.S. 
role in effecting the return of Nazi-confiscated moveable 
property, founded the Interdivisional Committee on Reparations, 
Restitution, and Property Rights.24  This Committee resolved 
that Nazi-confiscated property in the possession of the U.S. 
military would be returned to the governments of the countries 
from which the Nazis had removed them.25  Under this “external 
restitution” policy, these foreign governments, in turn, were 
expected to determine the lawful owners of properties within 
their borders, and arrange for their return.26 
 
20 See The Monuments Men, MONUMENTS MEN FOUND., https://www.monument 
smenfoundation.org/the-heroes/the-monuments-men (last visited October 4, 2018). 
Most of the Monuments Men were Americans, and some of the “men” were women. 
Id. 
21 Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in 
Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control, COMMISSION FOR LOOTED ART IN 
EUROPE, https://www.lootedartcommission.com/inter-allied-declaration (last visited 
November 2, 2018). 
22 See Restitution Appeals Reports, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 
https://hls.harvard.edu/library/digital-collections/court-of-restitution-appeals-
reports/ (providing digital access to twelve volumes of documentation covering 
hundreds of claims handled by the United States Court of Restitution Appeals). 
23 Id. 
24 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2–3, Marei Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011) (No. 09–1254).  
25 Id. at 2. 
26 Id. President Truman at the Potsdam Conference approved the Committee’s 
policies in 1945. Id. at 3. 
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At the end of the War, each of the three Allied Zones 
governing post-war Europe established similar regulations by 
which individual states would return properties to the parties 
from whom the Nazis had appropriated them.27  These 
regulations established periods in which claimants had to assert 
their petitions and judicial agencies to adjudicate them.28 
The work of the Monuments Men, and the efficacy of the 
Allies’ policies following the War, led to the return of a great deal 
of artwork and other valuables to the families and institutions 
from which the Nazis had confiscated them.29  However, given 
the massive scale of moveable property that was dislocated 
during the War, it is not surprising that disputes over valuable 
works whose ownership and possession shifted during that 
tumultuous period continue to arise seventy years later. 
The Nazi regime kept meticulous records of its acquisitions, 
despite—or perhaps because of—the fact that they typically 
involved forced sales or outright theft.30  This documentation has 
helped individuals and institutions seeking to recover artworks 
confiscated by the Nazis, particularly in recent years as digital 
archives and search tools provide universal access to information 
about the current location of these objects.31 
Organizations like the World Jewish Congress (“WJC”) have 
promoted continuing restitution of artworks displaced during the 
Holocaust.32  After Ronald Lauder’s brief stint as President 
Reagan’s ambassador to Austria,33 Lauder focused on promoting 
 
27 See id. at 2. 
28 Id. at 3. 
29 See Restitution Appeals Reports, supra note 22; see also Thérèse O’Donnell, 
The Restitution of Holocaust Looted Art and Transnational Justice: The Perfect 
Storm or the Raft of Medusa?, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 49, 54 (2011) (U.S. Forces alone 
recovered $5 billion worth of art in the years directly following the war). 
30 See Sonia van Gilder Cooke, Found: Nazi Records of Hitler’s Looted Art, TIME 
(Mar. 30, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/03/30/found-nazi-records-of-hitlers-
looted-art/ (last visited on October 10, 2018). The precise recordkeeping may have 
been motivated by practical concerns, but was also intended to lend an aura of 
legitimacy to Nazi usurpation of private property. 
31 See, e.g., Holocaust-Era Research Resources (2003), GETTY RES. INST., 
http://www.getty.edu/research/tools/guides_bibliographies/holocaust_provenance.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
32 See COMM’N FOR ART RECOVERY, http://www.commartrecovery.org (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
33 Mutual antipathy between Ronald Lauder and Austria’s politicians prompted 
Lauder’s departure, after eighteen months as U.S. ambassador, from Vienna. See 
Henry Kamm, Vienna Journal; A New Yorker’s Anguish in the Land of Waldheim, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1987, at A4. 
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the State Department’s sponsorship of the Washington 
Conference on Holocaust Era Assets, and the ensuing Principles 
on Nazi-Confiscated Art.34  The U.S. museum community adopted 
the desiderata that this meeting established when it 
promulgated rigorous protocols for acquisition and handling of 
Holocaust-era works.35 
Political pressure from initiatives like the 1998 Washington 
Conference has placed museums in the awkward position of 
making their collections more vulnerable to external claims in 
order to maintain their reputations for integrity, while 
simultaneously safeguarding their collections as public trusts.  
Accordingly, museums are attractive targets for such claims not 
only for the obvious reason that they deal primarily with 
valuable works of art, but also, and paradoxically, because many 
of them have made significant efforts to determine and identify 
publicly works in their inventories whose ownership changed 
during the Holocaust era.36 
II. HOLOCAUST-ERA ARTWORKS: LEGISLATION & LITIGATION 
A. HEAR Act of 2016 
Politicians and lawyers who have advocated on behalf of 
private parties asserting claims to Holocaust-era works in 
museums have complained of museums resorting to “technical” 
legal defenses, specifically statutes of limitations, to forestall 
 
34 See DORA APEL, MEMORY EFFECTS: THE HOLOCAUST AND THE ART OF 
SECONDARY WITNESSING 85 (2002). 
35 See Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era, AMERICAN ALL. 
OF MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/ 
collections-stewardship/objects-during-the-nazi-era (last visited on Oct. 4, 2018) 
(describing the protocols and ethical guidelines for acquiring and handling 
Holocaust-era works). 
36 Listings of ongoing and resolved disputes involving such works reveal the 
degree to which claimants have targeted public museums. A list compiled by the law 
firm Herrick Feinstein LLP in 2015, indicates that of fifty-seven claims the firm has 
identified as having been made in the United States over the past twenty years or 
so, museums were the defendants in thirty-one of them. See Resolved Stolen Art 
Claims, HERRICK FEINSTEIN (2015), http://www.herrick.com/content/uploads/ 
2016/01/2baf90026004c362078b75ecab983961.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
Stephen Clark, The Getty’s Chief Counsel, published a list of WWII restitution 
cases. Stephen Clark, World War II Restitution Cases, ALI – ABA COURSE OF STUDY; 
LEGAL ISSUES IN MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION (2009). Thirty-two of the forty-three 
U.S. cases he identified involved claims against museums; all but two of the thirty-
five recorded claims in Europe were lodged against public museums. Id. at 371–400. 
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such claims.37  In 2016, Ronald Lauder initiated a lobby seeking 
federal legislation that would preempt all existing federal and 
state statutes of limitation in such disputes.38 
The resulting bipartisan bill, HEAR, specifically exempts 
claimants litigating ownership of Holocaust-era artworks from 
extant state statutes of limitations, and guarantees them the 
opportunity to prosecute their claims anytime within six years of 
their actual discovery of the identity and location of the works in 
question.39  In early December 2016, Congress passed the bill, 
which President Obama signed into law on the 16th of the same 
month.40 
Congress enacted HEAR hastily, after the chair of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Grassley, expedited its 
consideration.41  None of the witnesses at the Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearing on HEAR represented the interests of art 
museums and the public they serve.42  Committee members were 
almost uniformly unquestioning in their support for the 
legislation; only Senator Mike Lee expressed skepticism as to the 
need for the proposed legislation, questioning: (1) why it would 
prohibit defendants from invoking the equitable doctrine of  
 
 
37 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Kaye, Looted Art: What Can and Should be Done, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 657, 658–59 (1998) (“[H]olders of stolen art treasures often operate 
under the assumption that, if secrecy is maintained for a long enough time, the 
statute of limitations will ultimately protect them.”). 
38 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130 
Stat. 1524. On June 7, 2016 two Senate Judiciary subcommittees held a hearing on 
HEAR. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act: Hearing on S.2763 Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitution and Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal 
Rights and Federal Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) 
(available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?410737-1/actress-helen-mirren-testifies-
recovery-art-confiscated-holocaust) [hereinafter HEAR Senate Hearing]. 
39 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 5. Actual knowledge does not 
require a claimant to demonstrate reasonable care or diligence that constructive 
knowledge requires. See Actual Knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
40 162 CONG. REC. H7333 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2016); 162 CONG. REC. S7130 (daily 
ed. Dec. 9, 2016). Professor Herbert Lazerow has thoroughly parsed the legislative 
history and text of HEAR, observing that: (1) it is likely to have little effect in New 
York, the most popular state for litigating Holocaust recovery cases, (2) it will make 
litigation in this area more expensive, (3) it may be unconstitutional on equal 
protection grounds, and (4) by creating more uncertainty as to outcomes, will likely 
promote mediation and negotiation of these claims. See generally Herbert Lazerow, 
Holocaust Art Disputes: The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 51 
INT’L LAW. 195 (2018). 
41 See HEAR Senate Hearing, supra note 38. 
42 Id. 
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laches, (2) why it should be limited to the consequences of one 
specific genocide, and (3) why federal law should deal with 
property theft—an area typically left to the states.43 
HEAR could affect the disposition of many Holocaust-era art 
claims, whether lodged against museums, dealers and auction 
houses, or private collectors.44  The text of the bill specifically 
identifies the dispositions of two disputes, both involving claims 
against high-profile public museums, as evidencing the need for 
federal legislation to preempt existing temporal limitations for 
such claims.45  In both these cases, however, while the courts 
were cognizant of statutes of limitations, they also carefully 
considered the claims’ factual bases, which rendered them 
meritless regardless of their untimeliness.46  Similar factual 
circumstances are in play in recently asserted Holocaust-era 
claims.47 
B. Holocaust Era Art Litigation & the HEAR Act 
1. Seger-Thomshitz 
Supporters of HEAR’s sui generis constraints on statute of 
limitations defenses in Holocaust-era art disputes claim that 
defendants, museums in particular, who assert them to challenge 
the legitimacy of claims asserted decades after alleged 
misappropriations, are resorting to “technical defenses” that 
allow them to duck ethical quandaries and resolutions based “on 
the merits.”48  They cite the dispositions of Claudia Seger-
 
43 Id. The prohibition of defendants invoking laches was deleted from the text of 
HEAR prior to its enactment. 
44 Under HEAR, disputes previously barred by temporal limitations may be 
revived if fewer than six years have passed between actual knowledge by the 
claimant and the end of a statutory limitations period that barred it. Holocaust 
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5(e), 130 Stat. 1524, 
1527 (2016). Two commentators have described HEAR as a minefield of 
contradictions and ambiguities, specifically as to whether HEAR is intended to limit 
claims discovered after 1999 but before 2016, or to resuscitate post-1999 claims 
otherwise barred by statutes of limitations. See Simon Frankel & Sari Sharoni, More 
Uncertainty on Nazi-Era Art Restitution Claims, LAW360 (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/970980/more-uncertainty-on-nazi-era-art-
restitution-claims.  
45 See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 2(6)(7). 
46 See infra Part II.B. 
47 See infra Part II.B. 
48 See Frankel & Forrest, supra note 14, at 299–30, 303–04 (criticizing the 
published opinions of Douglas Davidson, erstwhile State Department Special Envoy 
for Holocaust Issues, and the publications of law professor Jennifer Kreder, for 
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Thomschitz’s simultaneous claims against Dunbar, a private 
collector in New Orleans, and Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts, as 
examples of the inequitable consequences that stem from the 
application of extant statutes of limitation in claims involving 
Holocaust-era artwork.49 
In 2009, in a federal district court in Louisiana, Claudia 
Seger-Thomschitz claimed an Oskar Kokoschka painting once 
owned by Oskar Reichel.  Oskar was the father of her benefactor, 
Raimund Reichel, to whom she was unrelated.50  Reichel had sold 
the painting in Vienna during WWII to Otto Kallir, a well-known 
Jewish art dealer.51  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Dunbar, a private collector from whom 
Seger-Thomschitz had sought to obtain the painting, and the 
Fifth Circuit upheld this decision.52 
The district court based its ruling upon evidence establishing 
that the claimant’s in-laws had sold the work in a legal and 
voluntary sale.53  The court noted that the Nazis had confiscated 
other property from the Reichels, for which the family had sought 
and obtained post-war restitution from the Austrian 
government.54  In other words, the fact that those most 
knowledgeable about and directly entitled to property once 
owned by Oskar Reichel, claimed other works but not this 
Kokoschka work, indicated that they had no legal right to it. 
While litigating her claim against Dunbar in Louisiana, 
Seger-Thomschitz brought a factually similar action against the 
Museum of Fine Arts (MFA) in Boston, claiming another 
 
positing that museums have behaved unethically in responding to claims to 
Holocaust-era artworks). 
49 See, e.g., Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The New Battleground of Museum Ethics 
and Holocaust-Era Claims: Technicalities Trumping Justice or Responsible 
Stewardship for the Public Trust?, 88 OREGON L. REV. 37, 72–75 (2009). 
50 Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 638 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661 (E.D. La. 2009), aff’d, 
615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2010). “It is not clear how Raimund [Reichel] and Seger-
Thomschitz knew each other. She is described in one document as his ‘select-niece,’ 
but they are not blood relatives.” Museum of Fine Arts v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 
F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010). 
51 See Museum of Fine Arts, 623 F.3d at 3–4. Otto Kallir ultimately settled in 
New York where he reestablished his dealership as the Galerie St. Etienne, now run 
by his granddaughter.  See GALERIE ST. ETIENNE, https://www.gseart.com/about 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
52 See Dunbar, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 659, aff’d, 615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2010). 
53 Id. at 664. 
54 Id. 
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Kokoschka painting once owned by Reichel.55  The MFA’s 
exhaustive provenance research in response to the claim, which 
was noted by the court, established its good title to the work.56  
Only after the MFA had determined its rightful ownership did it 
assert that the plaintiff’s claim was also barred by the 
Massachusetts statute of limitations.57  Ultimately, the courts in 
both Dunbar and MFA dismissed Seger-Thomschitz’s claims 
having reviewed the earlier actions of the Reichel family 
indicating that even if Seger-Thomschitz’s claims were not time-
barred, they would fail on the merits.58 
In both disputes, Seger-Thomschitz attempted to overcome 
state statutes of limitation that enabled the courts’ efficient 
disposition of her claims, asserting that in the case of Holocaust-
era claims, such statutes were preempted by her vaguely 
articulated “federal common law” based on U.S. foreign policy.59  
To this proposition, the circuit court in Dunbar responded: “No 
court has ever adopted what Appellant is urging here—some 
form of special federal limitations period governing all claims 
involving Nazi-confiscated artwork.”60  HEAR now provides 
precisely such a “special federal limitations period” for such 
claims.61  The following review of other recent Holocaust-era art 
claims considers whether they indicate a need for, or reveal the 
potential efficacy of, this legislation, particularly in claims 
involving public collections. 
 
 
55 Museum of Fine Arts v. Seger-Thomschitz, No. 08-10097-RWZ, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 58826, at *1–*2 (D. Mass. Oct. 14, 2010), aff’d, 623 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2010). 
56 See id. at *19; see also Museum of Fine Arts v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 
5 (1st Cir. 2010). 
57 See Museum of Fine Arts, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58826, at *11–*13. 
58 See Dunbar, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 664–65 (E.D. La. 2009); see also Museum of 
Fine Arts, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58826, at *27. 
59 See Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 576; Museum of Fine Arts, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
58826, at *16. 
60 Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 576–77. Seger-Thomschitz extrapolated her “federal 
common law” from principles agreed upon in the Terezin Declaration (2009) and 
Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art (1998), neither of which 
is legally binding. Id. at 578. Even if they were, they would not have applied to this 
dispute, which did not involve Nazi-confiscated art. Id. at 576. 
61 Id. at 576; Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-
308, §§ 3(2), 5(a), 130 Stat. 1524, 1525-26 (2016).  
520 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:509   
2. Bakalar & Nagy 
In 2006, Milos Vavra and Leon Fischer, distant heirs of 
Austrian art collector Franz Grunbaum, claimed title to a 
drawing, “Seated Woman With a Bent Left Leg,” by Egon Schiele, 
long owned by a good-faith purchaser David Bakalar.62  They 
asserted, in federal district court in New York, that the Nazis 
had looted the drawing from Grunbaum’s collection.63  Therefore, 
the drawing was stolen property to which they were entitled as 
Grunbaum’s heirs.64  However, the claimants were unable to 
establish that the Nazis had appropriated the work from 
Grunbaum and, given the preponderance of evidence to the 
contrary, the court concluded that the Nazis had not done so.65  
The district court also took note of the extraordinarily attenuated 
relationships between the claimants and the pre-WWII owner of 
the drawing.66 
The many heirs who predeceased Vavra and Fischer were 
aware of Grunbaum’s collection, and the dreadful circumstances 
of his demise.67  None of these heirs, all of whom were much more 
directly related to Grunbaum than the plaintiffs, ever claimed 
rights to the collection or alleged the Nazis had looted it.68  And, 
even if they had had a colorable claim to the collection, by not 
asserting it, they abandoned it long ago.69  To allow distant heirs 
to make a claim—even assuming it is asserted in good faith—
that rightfully should have been made by others many years 
earlier, would be unjust to good-faith purchasers like Bakalar, 
whose ownership of the work went unchallenged for half a 
century.70  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment on both grounds.71 
By 2017, Fischer had died.  Shortly after HEAR became law, 
Fischer’s heirs—obviously even more distantly related to 
Grunbaum than was Fischer—and Milos Vavra, lodged another 
 
62 See Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 500 
Fed. App’x. 6 (2d Cir. 2012). 
63 Id. at 298.  
64 See id.  
65 See id. at 298–99. 
66 See id. at 296 (observing that Vavra is the nephew of the daughter of the 
sister of Grunbaum; Fischer is the son of the daughter of the brother of the wife of 
Grunbaum). 
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 296–97. 
69 See id. at 305–06. 
70 Id. 
71 See Bakalar v. Vavra, 500 Fed. App’x. 6, 8-9 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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claim to Schiele drawings, this time in New York’s Supreme 
Court.72  The case is remarkable in that it involves claims to 
works from the same Grunbaum collection that the federal 
district court, several years earlier in Bakalar, determined had 
not been stolen by the Nazis.73 
The factual and legal issues in this new claim are essentially 
the same as those of the claim these plaintiffs alleged previously 
against Bakalar, which was adjudicated against them in federal 
district court, and whose verdict the Second Circuit affirmed.74  
In fact, the defendant in the new case, London art dealer Richard 
Nagy, deliberately delayed purchasing the claimed works until 
after the district and appellate courts in Bakalar had established 
that the collection containing these works had not been looted, 
and that there was no basis for Fischer and Vavra’s claim to 
them.75 
Fischer and Vavra brought their second claim in New York 
state court, hoping that this alternate forum might ignore or 
counter federal court precedent dealing with their earlier 
allegation with the same factual circumstances.76  They 
referenced HEAR, claiming that this recently enacted federal 
legislation precludes Nagy’s laches defense.  In 2011 Bakalar 
successfully asserted the same defense—that the plaintiffs’ 
forbears were well aware of Grunbaum’s collection and did not 
pursue ownership of it—to establish rightful ownership of his 
Schiele drawing from the same collection.77 
 
72 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2, 
Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629 (N.Y. Sup. 2017) (No. 161799/2015), 2017 WL 
2558345. 
73 Id. As the defendant’s attorney observed: “[This claim is] kind of offensive to 
everybody who’s been involved in this field, claimants and otherwise, to keep touting 
something which the courts have decided. You had your trial. Evidence was 
presented. It’s over.” William D. Cohan, A Suit Over Schiele Drawings Invokes New 
Law on Nazi-Looted Art, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2017, at C1. 
74 Cohan, supra note 73; see Bakalar, 500 Fed. App’x. at 8–9; see also Bakalar, 
F. Supp. 2d at 294. 
75 See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 21–22, Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629 (N.Y. Sup. 2017) (No. 
161799/2015), 2017 WL 8801014. 
76 See Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower 
Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 91–
95 (2015) (arguing that allowing state courts to diverge from lower federal court 
precedent leads to intrastate conflicts and forum shopping). 
77 See Bakalar, F. Supp. 2d at 303. 
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Fischer and Vavra undoubtedly realized that the prohibition 
of laches defenses in the initial draft of HEAR was challenged 
during the Senate committee hearing on the legislation and 
struck from the text of the bill that was passed into law.78  HEAR 
does not offer plaintiffs any new or stronger legal bases for their 
claims; Fischer and Vavra’s invocation of this legislation is 
simply an attempt to influence the court’s handling of the dispute 
with recent evidence of Congress’s sympathy towards Holocaust-
era claimants. 
3. Ullin & Von Saher 
a. Ullin v. Detroit Institute of Arts 
The claimant in Ullin sought to obtain from the Detroit 
Institute of Arts (“DIA”) a Van Gogh painting that his mother 
had sold in Switzerland, in 1938 to Jewish refugee art dealers 
with whom she was acquainted.79  Just as the DIA had concluded 
earlier in its investigation of the painting’s provenance, the 
district court determined that this sale had been voluntary and 
legal, and that the plaintiff’s claim had no legal footing.80  Ullin 
hoped to capitalize upon the impertinent fact that his mother had 
sold the painting after she left Nazi Germany in an effort to taint 
the legality and ethicality of the sale by which the DIA 
ultimately acquired the painting as a donation from a good-faith 
purchaser.81 
Having expended resources to investigate Ullin’s claim and 
having determined it was unfounded, the DIA naturally sought 
to dispose of the case as expeditiously and economically as 
 
78 See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 24, Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629 (N.Y. Sup. 2017) (No. 161799/2015), 
2017 WL 8801014  
(noting how HEAR was amended to remove prior references to laches); see Lazerow, 
supra note 40, at 33 (noting that the legislative history for HEAR establishes that 
Congress deliberately preserved the defense of laches by amending HEAR’s original 
language). 
79 Detroit Inst, of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Mar. 31, 2007). 
80 See id. at *2. 
81 Id. at *1–*2; see also Complaint For an Order Quieting Title to Property 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1655, Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 8, 
Detroit Inst. Of Arts v. Ullin, No. 2:06-cv-10333, 2006 WL 360144 (E.D. Mich. Jan 
24, 2006). 
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possible.82  To this end, it asserted that the claim was barred by 
the three-year state statute of limitations for conversion 
actions.83  The court agreed with the museum and dismissed the 
claim “with prejudice,” prohibiting the plaintiff from litigating 
the claim further and signaling its opinion that the claim was 
baseless on its merits.84 
HEAR does not permit Claude Ullin to reopen his claim 
because he identified the location of the painting in question 
after 1998, and more than six years have passed since the district 
court ruled in favor of the DIA in 2007.85  HEAR pointedly also 
identifies, however, the disposition of Von Saher v. Norton Simon 
Museum of Art as evidencing the need for a federal statute 
exempting claims to Holocaust-era artworks from temporal 
defenses.86  The Von Saher litigation has involved temporal 
defenses, but also brings into focus ethical issues associated with 
claims asserted by attenuated private parties for works in public 
museums.87  Accordingly, it is worth examining this dispute at 
some length. 
b. Marei von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art 
i. Cranach’s Adam and Eve 
Lucas Cranach the Elder (1472–1553), known among his 
contemporaries as “swiftest painter” (pictor celerrimus), 
produced over fifty paintings on the subject of the Temptation of 
Man.88  He painted the works now owned by the Norton Simon  
 
 
 
82 Ullin, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1–*2. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. at *4. 
85 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5(e), 
130 Stat. 1524, 1527 (2016). The Washington Conference Principles were 
promulgated in 1998, the same year in which the U.S. Congress passed the 
Holocaust Victims Redress Act. Id. §§ 2(3), (4). 
86 Id. § 2(7). 
87 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. VC 07-2866-
JFW (JTLx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95757, at *957–*58 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 18, 2007), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied. 564 U.S. 1037 
(2011), remanded to 862 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d 754 F.3d 712 (9th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied. 135 S. Ct. 1158 (2015), remanded to 2015 WL 12910626 
(C.D. Cal, Aug. 9, 2016). 
88 See CAROLINE CAMPBELL ET AL., TEMPTATION IN EDEN: LUCAS CRANACH’S 
ADAM AND EVE 19 (2007). 
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Museum as separate renderings of Adam and Eve, to be 
displayed as a pair.89  The paintings were likely commissioned for 
the domestic delectation of a member of the Saxon court.90 
The paintings, at one point fused into a single panel, depict 
Eve as coy and nubile, and Adam as handsome but puzzled—
raising his arm to finger curls on his head, conveying both 
hesitation and sensual allure.91  These works are among the most 
appealing of Cranach’s treatments of this subject, along with his 
equally famous single-panel, Adam and Eve, in London’s 
Courtauld Gallery.92  In 2006, the paintings at the Norton Simon 
were appraised at about thirty million dollars.93 
It is not known when the two paintings migrated to Russia, 
but in the 1920s, Sergei Giliarov, a museum official in Kiev, 
located them at the Holy Trinity Gate Church,94 now a UNESCO 
world heritage site.95  In documenting his discovery Giliarov 
noted: “From where, when, and in what manner this work could 
have arrived at the Trinity Church remains an open question.”96  
Perhaps the Cranachs had belonged to an aristocratic family like 
the Stroganoffs, whose property had been confiscated by the 
Bolsheviks, transported, temporarily stored in Kiev, and then 
ultimately sold.97  Or, perhaps centuries ago the paintings had  
 
 
 
 
 
89 See Search the Collection, NORTON SIMON MUSEUM, https://www.norton 
simon.org/art/search-the-
collection/result?title%5B%5D=&select_earliest_year=&select_latest_year=&earliest
_year=&latest_year=&material=&accession_id=&sort=1&length=0&keyword=lucas
%20cranach%20the%20elder (last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
90 Eve, NORTON SIMON MUSEUM, https://www.nortonsimon.org/art/detail/ 
M.1991.1.P (last visited November 3, 2018).  
91 See SERGEI O. GILIAROV, A RECENTLY DISCOVERED WORK OF CRANACH IN THE 
MUSEUM OF ART OF THE UKRAINIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 22 (1929). 
92 See generally CAMPBELL ET AL., , supra note 88. 
93 See Sarah Cascone, Norton Simon Museum’s Appeal Denied in Case of Nazi-
Looted Lucas Cranach Paintings, ARTNET NEWS (April 3, 2015), 
https://news.artnet.com/market/norton-simon-appeal-denied-lucas-cranach-284850 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
94 See GILIAROV, supra note 91, at 22. 
95 See World Heritage List, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/527 (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
96 See GILIAROV, supra note 91, at 21-22. 
97 See MCMEEKIN, supra note 19, at 35–53 (describing the systematic looting of 
the valuables of families and the Church before and during the Bolshevik seizure of 
power). 
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been donated to the Ukrainian Church and had been housed at 
the Holy Trinity Gate Church in Kiev until the Bolsheviks seized 
them early in the Twentieth Century.98 
ii. Bolsheviks’ Confiscation and Liquidation of the Cranachs 
In 1917, the Russian Revolution initiated its often violent 
campaign of looting moveable property owned by families, 
churches, synagogues, etc., whose land and buildings the 
Bolsheviks had expropriated.99  The subsequently established 
U.S.S.R. obtained dominion over all this property.100  In 1931, 
shortly after U.S.S.R. officials encountered the Cranach 
paintings in the expropriated Holy Trinity Church in Kiev, the 
Soviet government sold them in Berlin through Rudolf Lepke’s 
auction house.101  Lepke, well known for dealing in confiscated 
property, had negotiated an agreement with the Soviets under 
which he would have the exclusive right to auction art works 
looted by the Bolsheviks.102 
Despite Western opprobrium in the 1920s toward the 
establishment of the Soviet Union, and its expropriation of the 
property of individuals and religious groups,103 Germany 
accommodated, under the terms of the Rapallo Treaty (1922), the 
Soviets’ plan to sell to Western collectors valuable art works that 
 
98 Luis Li, an attorney with the firm Munger Tolles, which is representing the 
Norton Simon Museum in the dispute with Von Saher, has suggested that it may be 
more likely that prior to the Revolution in 1917, Adam and Eve belonged to a private 
family collection rather than that of the Church. Images of women in iconography in 
the interiors of Russian Orthodox churches at that time invariably showed them 
fully clothed and veiled, unlike Cranach’s image of Eve showing her virtually naked, 
with her breast exposed. Telephone Interview with Luis Li, Munger Tolles (Aug. 10, 
2016). See SELLING RUSSIA’S TREASURES: THE SOVIET TRADE IN NATIONALIZED ART 
1917–1938 124 (Natalya Semyonova & Nicolas V. Iljine, eds., 2013) (making the 
puzzling assertion: “Because the catalogue for the Lepke auction made no mention of 
the provenance of the paintings, it was thought that all of them came from the 
Stroganov collection. Thus, Stroganov heirs long contested the rights to the Cranach 
canvases until, having clarified the history of the matter in the Hermitage, they 
dropped their claims.”). 
99 See generally MCMEEKIN, supra note 19, at 37–38. 
100 See generally id. at 39. 
101 See RUDOLPH LEPKE’S KUNST-AUCTIONS-HAUS, SAMMLUNG STROGANOFF, 
LENINGRAD 40–41 (1931). See also Semyonova & Iljine, supra note 98, at 124. 
102 See MCMEEKIN, supra note 19, at 211. 
103 See, e.g., the 1939 film Ninotchka, in which a humorless Soviet agent played 
by Greta Garbo is sent to Paris to retrieve jewels that had been seized from citizens 
during the Russian Revolution after Soviet delegates abandon the plan to sell them. 
NINOTCHKA, (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). 
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had been confiscated by the Bolsheviks.104  Under this agreement, 
Germany recognized the Soviet state in order to sell its goods—
particularly military and industrial equipment—to the Soviet 
Union.  Germany thereby enabled the near-bankrupt Soviets to 
pay for such material from the proceeds of sales to westerners, 
transacted in Germany, of properties that the Soviet state had 
confiscated from its own citizens.105  The Rapallo Treaty also 
enabled Germany to develop and test weapons that were later 
used by the Nazis in their European offensive—violating the 
terms Germany had agreed to under the Treaty of Versailles at 
the end of the First World War.106 
iii. Goudstikker’s Brief Ownership of the Cranachs 
When Dutch art dealer Jacques Goudstikker purchased 
Cranach’s Adam and Eve at the Lepke auction, he was aware of 
their sordid provenance.107  He may have believed that the 
paintings had been confiscated from the Stroganoff family rather 
than the Ukrainian Church because the Soviets had included the 
paintings in the inventory of an auction identified as “The 
Stroganoff Collection.”108 
Goudstikker paid 47,000 Reichsmarks for the two 
paintings109—roughly $11,000 in 1930, and about $150,000 in 
2016 dollars.110  Today, the paintings would likely sell for 
hundreds of times the adjusted amount of the 1931 sale.111  In 
other words, Goudstikker acquired at fire-sale prices works from 
the vast caches of looted and then nationalized art, jewelry, etc., 
with which the Soviet government flooded the market in the 
1920s and 1930s in its desperate effort to generate cash.112  Other 
 
104 See MCMEEKIN, supra note 19, at 199–215 (documenting the militarist and 
commercial motivations of this treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 See John Elliott, Stroganoff Art Sold in Berlin by Soviet Order, NEW YORK 
HERALD TRIBUNE, May 13, 1931, at 15 (noting Goudstikker’s acquisitions and the 
public warning issued by the Stroganoff family that they would hold the buyers 
responsible for any harm done to the pictures “they thus illegally acquire”). 
108 SAMMLUNG STROGANOFF, supra note 101. See also Semyonova & Iljine, supra 
note 98, at 119. 
109 SAMMLUNG STROGANOFF, supra note 101, at 40–41. 
110 See Harold Marcuse, Historical Dollar-to-Marks Currency Conversion Page, 
U.C. SANTA BARBARA, http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/ 
currency.htm (last visited Sep. 25, 2018). 
111 See Cascone, supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
112 See SUZANNE MUCHNIC, ODD MAN IN: NORTON SIMON AND THE PURSUIT OF 
CULTURE 179–80 (1998). 
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Western dealers did likewise, including the lately disgraced and 
now defunct, Knoedler Gallery in New York. Knoedler obtained 
extraordinarily fine works in this fashion that it peddled to 
Andrew Mellon, former U.S. Treasury Secretary, and a prized, 
and spectacularly wealthy customer.113 
While the Stroganoff family or the Ukrainian Church may 
have owned the Cranachs for centuries, Jacques Goudstikker 
owned them for less than a decade.114  In 1940, Goudstikker, 
fearing Nazi persecution, left the Netherlands, leaving behind a 
large inventory of paintings, including the Cranachs.115  Without 
his authorization, his associates remaining in Amsterdam sold 
most of the firm’s inventory through a forced sale to Hermann 
Göring, who moved the Cranachs to his estate near Berlin116—
relatively near in fact, to Wittenberg, where Cranach had lived 
four centuries earlier.117  Göring paid the Goudstikker firm two 
million guilders for the works he appropriated from it—
approximately the same total amount Jacques Goudstikker had 
paid over time to acquire the same works.118 
After the U.S. military impounded Göring’s collection in the 
aftermath of WWII, in accordance with the U.S. policy of external 
restitution, the Cranachs were entrusted to the Dutch 
government, which assumed responsibility for ultimate 
 
113 See MCMEEKIN, supra note 19, at 220 (“In one of the most grotesque ironies 
of Communism, it was Western fat-cat capitalists like Mellon who inherited the 
greater part of Russia’s patrimony, while the Russian proletariat received only the 
lash.”). 
114 See Carolina A. Miranda, Court Rules Museum Can Keep Nazi-Looted Adam 
and Eve Masterpieces with a Hidden Past, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/miranda/la-et-cam-norton-simon-good-
title-cranach-20160817-snap-story.html#. 
115 Id. 
116 See Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 6–7, Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-2866 JFW (SS) (C.D. Cal. June 
13, 2016). Göring paid approximately the total purchase price for the collection, but 
not its “replacement value” which was presumably a good deal more having been 
enhanced by Goudstikker’s connoisseurship. Defendant’s Notice of Motion and 
Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
Thereof at 6, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-2866 
JFW (SSx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016).. 
117 See generally PETER MOSER, LUCAS CRANACH: HIS LIFE, HIS WORLD AND HIS 
ART (Kenneth Wynne trans., 2005). 
118 Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 13, Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-2866 JFW (SSx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
1, 2016). 
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distribution of such property.119  Goudstikker had died in an 
accident on the ship on which he left the Netherlands, and his 
wife, along with other family members with financial interest in 
Goudstikker’s inventory, resolved not to submit a claim to the 
Dutch government for the paintings acquired by Göring.120 
They did not submit a claim because obtaining the paintings 
would result in the government annulling the forced sale that 
Göring had imposed on the Goudstikker firm to acquire the 
works.121  The family did not want this voidance because it would 
entail forfeit of Göring’s two million guilders, or what remained 
of that payment, to obtain the inventory of an art dealership that 
Goudstikker’s heirs did not want to revive.122 
By electing not to file a claim to recover the firm’s erstwhile 
inventory in favor of retaining the monies Göring had paid for it, 
the Goudstikkers transferred ownership of the inventory to the 
Dutch government.123  The government then sold many of the 
works and placed others, including the Cranachs, in various 
national museums.124 
In 1961, George Stroganoff, descendant of the exiled Russian 
family, claimed four paintings he asserted the Bolsheviks had 
confiscated from his ancestors, and which were among those 
returned by the Allied forces to the Dutch government at the end 
of WWII.125  Among the four works, were the Cranachs that 
Goudstikker had acquired at Lepke’s “Stroganoff Collection” 
auction in Berlin thirty years earlier.126 
While the Dutch government asserted good title to the 
paintings, it may have recognized the injustice of the Bolsheviks’ 
seizure of the Stroganoff’s property.  For, in 1966, the Dutch 
government negotiated a settlement under which George 
Stroganoff abandoned another claim for a Rembrandt painting,  
 
 
119 Id. at 7. 
120 Id. at 6, 12. 
121 Id. at 13, 14. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 19. 
124 See Semyonova & Iljine, supra note 98, at 124. 
125 See Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 20–22, Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art, No. 07-2866 JFW (SS) (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2016). 
126 Proceedings (In Chambers): Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relif can be Granted at *1–*3, Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. CV 07-2866-JFW (JTLx), 2015 WL 
12910626 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015). 
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but was allowed to purchase the Cranachs from the 
government.127  Stroganoff subsequently sold the two Cranach 
paintings to Norton Simon.128 
iv. Von Saher’s Pursuit of Goudstikker’s Inventory 
In 2007, Marei von Saher initiated legal proceedings against 
the Norton Simon Museum seeking legal ownership of the 
Cranachs.129  Von Saher, née Langenbein, a figure skater from 
Germany, had married Jacques Goudstikker’s son Eduard who, 
in turn, had assumed his stepfather’s surname.130  Eduard died 
prematurely in 1996 and Marei was his sole heir.131 
The Goudstikkers had effectively conveyed to the Dutch 
government title to works they had elected not to claim in order 
to retain instead the funds Göring had paid for them.132  
Nevertheless, in the late 1990’s Marei von Saher attempted to 
obtain these works, or their monetary value, by appealing to the 
Dutch courts, which summarily rejected her claims as legally 
deficient.133 
 
127 See Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 21, Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-2866 JFW (SSx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
1, 2016). 
128 Id. at 22. 
129 Von Saher v. Norton Simon, 2007 WL 430276, No. CV 07-2866-JFW (JTLx), 
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2007). 
130 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 862 F. Supp. 2d 
1044, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Nicholas Glass, Collection of Grievances, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2006), https://www.ft.com/content/a51c4668-79f7-11db-8d70-
0000779e2340 (noting that Marei von Saher met her husband in Berlin where she 
had been performing in an ice-dancing revue while he was stationed there as an 
American GI). In pursuing their defense of ownership of the Cranachs, lawyers 
representing the Norton Simon Museum learned that Marei von Saher’s father had 
been a member of the Nazi party. See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 60, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum at Pasadena, 
No. 07-2866 JFW (SSx) (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2016). Marei cannot be held responsible for 
her father’s actions, but given that he was part of the regime responsible for 
confiscating the Cranachs from Goudstikker in Amsterdam, it is undeniably 
inconsonant that his daughter should be claiming ownership of them. Id. 
131 Glass, supra note 130. 
132 See Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 14–18, Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art, No. 07-2866 JFW (SSx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) 
(providing an exhaustive account of the Goudstikker firm’s deliberate strategy, 
based on financial interest, to seek “selective restitution” of property it was forced to 
sell, by which the Dutch government became owner of the Cranachs). 
133 See id. at 23. 
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In response to political pressure from the United States, 
specifically, promulgation of the Washington Principles of 1998, 
the Dutch government established a Restitution Committee that 
recommended less legally oriented consideration of Holocaust-era 
claims.134  In the spirit of this policy, and despite its position that 
it held good title to the works, in 2006, the Dutch government 
gave Von Saher around 200 paintings from national collections, 
which had once been within Goudstikker’s inventory.135 
Since this accommodation by the Dutch government in 2006, 
Von Saher has embarked on a spree of claims, seeking to obtain 
from European and American museums and private collectors as 
many of the works once in Goudstikker’s stock that she can 
locate.136  Using proceeds from sales of works she has successfully 
procured from the Dutch government and others, she has funded 
a prosecutorial enterprise involving lawyers and detectives.137 
v. Von Saher’s Claim Against the Norton Simon Museum 
In 2007, when Marei von Saher brought her initial claim 
against the Norton Simon Museum in federal district court in Los 
Angeles, the court did not evaluate her assertion of ownership of 
the Cranachs because it determined that she had based her case 
upon an unconstitutional California statute.138  In 2002, prior to 
filing her claim, Von Saher’s lawyers, realizing that the claim 
was long barred by the California statute of limitations, 
successfully lobbied the California legislature, through the 
temporarily established “Jewish Community Relations 
Committee,” to enact tailored legislation to accommodate Von 
Saher’s claim.139  The statute privileged claims against museums, 
 
134 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Commission for Art Recovery in Support of 
Petitioner at 11, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 564 U.S. 
1037 (2010) (No. 09-1254). 
135 See Alan Riding, Dutch to Return Art Seized by Nazis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/07/arts/design/dutch-to-return-art-seized-
by-nazis.html.  
136 See Benjamin Genocchio, Seized, Reclaimed, and Now on View, N.Y. TIMES 
(April 27, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/27 
brucect.html (discussing past and ongoing claims pursued by the law firm Herrick 
Feinstein LLP on behalf of Marei von Saher and her daughters). 
137 See Glass, supra note 130 (“The hunt for Goudstikker paintings goes on 
unremittingly.”). 
138 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. CV 07-
2866-JFW (JTLx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95757, at *9–*10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007). 
139 See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss; Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support Thereof at 2, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at 
Pasadena, No. 07-2866-JFW (JTLx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2011) (emphasis added) 
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based on assertions by the original owners or their heirs or 
beneficiaries, that the claimed artworks had been 
misappropriated during the Holocaust.140  Under this sui generis 
legislation, until 2010, these claims were to be exempt from 
California’s statute of limitations governing similar claims not 
involving Holocaust-era artifacts.141 
The district court determined that this exemption for 
disputes involving Holocaust-era artworks was an 
unconstitutional intrusion by the California legislature on the 
federal government’s exclusive authority over U.S. foreign 
policy.142  In other words, the statute, enacted at Von Saher’s 
behest, constituted ex-post-facto meddling by the California 
legislature in policies and procedures that had been agreed upon 
between the United States and the Netherlands at the end of 
WWII regarding the disposition of art works returned to the 
Netherlands by Allied forces.143 
When Von Saher appealed the district court’s dismissal of 
her claim, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court’s 
determination that the statutory basis of her claim was 
unconstitutional.144  Nevertheless, it granted Von Saher the 
opportunity to reassert her claim if she believed she could 
demonstrate that she had asserted it within the three-year 
period of California’s statute of limitations for the recovery of 
personal property.145 
Immediately following the appellate court’s decision, Von 
Saher’s lawyers again lobbied the California legislature to carve 
out an exception to the statute of limitations for actions to 
recover stolen property, which might accommodate her claim.146  
 
(“Seeing the writing on the wall, [Von Saher] sought, and obtained, an attempted 
legislative work-around. In an amendment to Section 338, that was proposed by 
Plaintiff’s counsel, the California legislature purported to lengthen the limitations 
period and substitute an actual-notice rule for the constructive-notice rule.”). 
140 Cal. Code Civ. P. § 354.3(b) (West 2006). 
141 See id § 354.3(c). 
142 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. CV 07-
2866-JFW (JTLx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95757, at *8 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 18, 2007). 
143 Id. at *7–*8. 
144 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016, 
1019 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We agree, and affirm the district court’s holding that § 354.3 
is preempted.”). 
145 See id. 
146 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 862 F. Supp. 2d 
1044, 1048 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“Although the bill was sponsored by the Committee 
on Judiciary, the ‘idea’ for the bill came from Randol Schoenberg, whose law firm 
represents Plaintiff in this action.”). 
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And in 2010, the legislature amended the statute, doubling the 
period in which claimants could lodge claims against museums 
for specific artworks that may have been misappropriated within 
the past century.147 
Von Saher also appealed the 2009 affirmation of the Ninth 
Circuit that the California Holocaust claims statute was 
unconstitutional, to the United States Supreme Court.148  The 
Supreme Court in turn solicited the opinions of the U.S. 
Departments of State and Justice on this question.149  In their 
amicus brief, these departments repudiated the California 
legislature’s intrusion on the foreign affairs prerogatives of the 
U.S. government through the statutory amendment enacted on 
Von Saher’s behalf, and recommended the Supreme Court not 
entertain Von Saher’s appeal.150 
Despite this disapproval by the U.S. government, in 2011, 
Von Saher reasserted her claim in district court, which again 
dismissed her claim outright.151  Regardless of the claim’s 
colorable viability under the revised California statute of 
limitations, the court observed incredulously that Von Saher 
“disputes that the Solicitor General has accurately expressed 
United States foreign policy, and asks the Court to supplant the 
Solicitor General’s statement of current United States foreign 
policy with her own.”152 
When Von Saher appealed this dismissal in 2014, Ninth 
Circuit Judge Dorothy Nelson justified her overturning of the 
lower court’s decision with the equivalent of a similar effort “to 
supplant the Solicitor General’s statement of current United 
States foreign policy with her own.”153  The majority’s opinion is 
rife with prejudice and dubious factual conclusions.  It discusses 
at length Göring’s confiscation of the Cranachs through a forced 
sale, but never mentions the Bolsheviks’ looting that led to 
Goudstikker’s questionable acquisition of them.154  It declares it 
 
147 Id. at 1048. 
148 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 564 U.S. 1037 
(2011). 
149 Order Inviting the Views of the Solicitor General, 562 U.S. 821 (2010).  
150 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9–10, Von Saher v. Norton 
Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 564 U.S. 821 (2010) (No. 09-1254). 
151 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 862 F. Supp. 2d 
1044, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
152 Id. at 1051. 
153 Id.; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 754 F.3d 712, 
715 (9th Cir. 2014). 
154 Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 715. 
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“[u]nfortunate[]” that the Dutch government did not have 
custody of the Cranachs when Von Saher made a claim against it 
in 2004, because the government had sold them to Stroganoff in 
1961.155  It opines that the paintings may not have been subject 
to bona fide post-war restitution proceedings in the Netherlands 
despite the fact that both the U.S. and the Dutch governments 
have established unequivocally that they were.156 
The majority found that Von Saher’s claim does not conflict 
with U.S. foreign policy because it is a dispute between private 
parties.157  Its opinion goes on to suggest, however, that if the 
Dutch government’s disposition of the Cranachs invoked the Act 
of State doctrine, such implication could potentially impede 
consideration of her claim by a U.S. court.158  In other words, if 
the sale of the Cranachs to Stroganoff constitutes an official act 
of the Dutch government, U.S. courts must respect it, 
particularly if failing to do so might conflict with U.S. diplomatic 
relations with the Netherlands.159  The Ninth Circuit then 
remanded the case to the district court to investigate the 
applicability of this doctrine to the dispute.160 
In 2016, the district court granted Norton Simon’s motion for 
summary judgment and established the museum’s good title to 
the Cranachs.161  Rather than exploring the potential 
applicability of the act of state doctrine to this dispute, as the 
Ninth Circuit had advised, the court addressed the more 
fundamental question as to whether the Dutch State had ever 
owned the Cranachs.162  Both parties agreed that if the Dutch 
State had once owned these works then Norton Simon would now 
have good title to them.163  Accordingly, the dispute could be 
settled by answering that question. 
 
155 Id. at 718. 
156 Id. Unsurprisingly, Nelson’s opinion, subscribed to by her similarly seasoned 
colleague Judge Harry Pregerson (age 92), provoked a dissenting opinion from the 
third member of the panel, Judge Kim Wardlaw. In Wardlaw’s dissent, the 
majority’s position constitutes an unauthorized and deleterious countering of the 
Executive’s pronouncement of U.S. foreign policy that was specifically expressed in 
connection with Von Saher’s claim. See id. at 727–29 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting). 
157 See id. at 725. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-2866-JFW 
(SSx), 2016 WL 7626153, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016) (granting defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment). 
162 See id. at *10. 
163 Id. at *8. 
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The court based its affirmative answer to this question by 
considering various royal decrees promulgated by the exiled 
Dutch government during WWII.164  These laws, the court found, 
unequivocally establish that during the restitution period 
following the war, the Dutch government became the owner of 
the Cranachs, and not merely a custodian as Von Saher 
claimed.165  Von Saher immediately appealed this determination 
to the Ninth Circuit, claiming the district court had incorrectly 
interpreted Dutch law.166 
In July 2018 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision, determining that the Dutch Government’s post-war 
disposition of the Cranachs, and specifically its transfer of their 
ownership to Stroganoff, was an act of state.167  The court 
observed that under the Act of State Doctrine, U.S. courts must 
recognize acts of state by foreign governments unless they violate 
principles of international law.168  The Dutch Government’s 
transfer of ownership to the Cranachs was an official and 
legitimate state transaction.169  Moreover, unlike commercial 
transactions effected among private citizens, the transfer of state 
property clearly implicated Dutch polity.170  In her concurring 
opinion, Judge Kim Wardlaw barely conceals her contempt for 
the plaintiff’s dogged pursuit of this wasteful claim: 
This case should not have been litigated through the summary 
judgment stage. The district court correctly dismissed this case 
on preemption grounds in March 2012 . . . So here we are in 
2018, over a decade from the date Von Saher filed her federal 
action, reaching an issue we need not have reached, to finally 
decide that the Cranachs, which have hung in the Norton Simon 
Museum nearly fifty years, may remain there.171 
 
 
164 Id. at *10. 
165 See id. at *14. The district court’s extensive discussion of the question of the 
Dutch government’s ownership relies heavily on the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment—a tour de force that handily dissects the extraordinary tangle of 
applicable Dutch and U.S. law and policy in this case. 
166 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at 
Pasadena, 897 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-56308). 
167 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 897 F.3d 1141 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
168 See id. at 1154.  
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 Id. at 1156 (Wardlaw, J., concurring).  
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 In light of the court’s exhaustive analysis of the facts and 
law involved in this dispute, and Judge Wardlaw’s trenchant 
concurrence as to the claim’s lack of merit, Von Saher’s 
subsequent petition for an en banc rehearing by the Ninth 
Circuit appears almost truculent. Unsurprisingly, the court 
denied her petition.172 
Von Saher plans to appeal the Ninth Circuit’s decision to the 
Supreme Court, which mandates a three-month period from the 
date of the decision in which to file a petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari.173 Von Saher, a seasoned and well-heeled litigant, was 
undoubtedly aware of the probability of the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling, and could have filed her petition to the Supreme Court 
within the prescribed period. Instead she applied directly to 
Justice Elena Kagan (Ninth Circuit Justice) seeking an extension 
of an additional three months in which to file, which Justice 
Kagan granted.174  
 Most of Von Saher’s Application to Justice Kagan is devoted 
to arguments about the merits of her claim, followed by dubious 
justifications for the extension, like her attorneys’ busy 
schedules, the feast of Chanukah and, most hubristic, the 
likelihood that the Supreme Court would grant her petition for 
Certiorari.175 Accordingly, Von Saher’s Application based upon a 
purported need for an extension, appears more likely to be an 
attempt to lay a foundation within the court, of a consensus in 
favor of granting her petition, by targeting the attention of a 
Justice she hopes may be sympathetic to her claim.   
vi. The HEAR Act and Von Saher’s Claim Against the Norton 
Simon Museum 
HEAR cites Von Saher’s claim to support its premise that 
disputes involving Holocaust-era artworks should be exempt 
from temporal defenses.176  The timeliness of Von Saher’s claim, 
 
172 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 16-56308, 
2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25758 (9th Cir. Sep. 11, 2018).  
173 SUP. CT. R. 13.  
174 See Petitioner’s Application to Extend Time to File Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. ___ (U.S., 
Nov. 20, 2018); Letter from Clerk of Supreme Court to Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, Marei Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at 
Pasadena, et al. Application No. 18A543 (Nov. 26, 2018). 
175 See Petitioner’s Application, supra note 174, at 8.  
176 Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2(6), 
130 Stat. 1524, 1525 (2016).  
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however, had no bearing on the district court’s recent decision in 
favor of the Norton Simon Museum.  As in the earlier Ullin and 
Seger-Thomschitz disputes, the district court found that even if 
Von Saher’s claim had been timely, it was meritless based on the 
facts of the case.177 
In 2009, when the Ninth Circuit ruled against Von Saher 
because California’s law exempting Holocaust claims from 
statutory time limits was unconstitutional, the court observed: 
“California’s real purpose was to create a friendly forum for 
litigating Holocaust restitution claims, open to anyone in the 
world to sue a museum or gallery.”178  The apparent objective of 
HEAR is to create a similarly friendly forum, but on a national 
scale, which would privilege claimants for Holocaust-era 
artworks by providing them an exceptional period in which to 
assert claims. 
HEAR enables claimants to overcome both challenges that 
their claims are untimely, and also that they are based on state 
law that impermissibly intrudes on the federal government’s 
exclusive authority over foreign policy.179  In other words, by 
enabling previously barred claims against foreign states and 
individuals, HEAR becomes de facto U.S. foreign policy, 
regardless of potential conflicts with the Executive, and the State 
Department in particular.180  Given that HEAR’s purpose is to 
disallow the use of statutes of limitations as the means to dismiss 
cases, it is worth considering the salutatory objectives of such 
defenses, and whether these may be met even when applied in 
Holocaust-era artwork claims.181 
As the time between an injustice and claims for reparation 
based on that injustice increases, society grows less sympathetic 
to the interests of claimants.  This ebbing is reflected in statutes 
of limitation that promote timely resolution of claims when facts 
relating to the injustice are freshest.  With the passage of time  
 
 
 
177 Von Saher, 2016 WL 7626153, at *8. 
178 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 578 F.3d 1016, 1026 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
179 See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 5(a).  
180 HEAR is not limited to claims against U.S. defendants. This is troublesome 
from a foreign policy perspective in its potential to affect the disposition of claims 
involving works owned by foreign governments, like those of European state 
collections. 
181 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 2(6).  
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both defendants and also claimants become increasingly 
attenuated from the parties responsible for the injustice, and the 
victims of it, respectively. 
For example, claims for financial reparations to African 
Americans living today, based on the enslavement of ancestors 
endured in the South until the Civil War, have gained little 
traction.182  Americans who instigated and benefited from the 
injustice of slavery, southern landowners in particular, are long 
dead and, like the Nazis eighty years later, were defeated in war.  
Owners of any remaining properties whose economic 
enhancement can be legitimately traced to enslaved labor are 
only distantly, or un-related to perpetrators of the earlier 
injustice.  Wresting assets from descendants and innocent 
purchasers 150 years after their wrongful acquisition is akin to 
holding children responsible for the crimes of their parents, or 
further-removed ancestors.  American society is, therefore, more 
comfortable with attempts to rectify the lingering injustices of 
slavery with efforts like affirmative action in education that, at 
least theoretically, benefit an entire class of people whose 
ancestors suffered a profound injustice. 
Likewise, statutes of limitation applied to property disputes 
reflect a collective belief that the right of a good-faith purchaser 
to hold title to legitimately acquired property outweighs the right 
of a claimant to assert at any time a legal interest in that 
property.183  They are not arbitrary or procrustean “technical” 
defenses that promote unethical outcomes by enabling 
defendants to thwart claimants from litigating justifiable claims 
of alleged civil wrongs.184  Rather, statutes of limitation for 
property claims promote fairness, and are intended to curb 
unjust outcomes that turn on documentation and memories that 
 
182 Georgetown University, along with a number of well-established U.S. 
universities that once benefited financially from slavery, recently took steps to atone 
for this past, by offering a preferential admission policy—not financial awards—to 
identifiable descendants of slaves whose lives they once capitalized on. See Rachael 
L. Swarns, Georgetown University Plans Steps to Atone for Slave Past, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 1, 2016, at A1. 
183 See Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the Limitations of Limitations Law, 29 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1015, 1019–1025 (1997) (identifying the two main objectives of 
limitations statutes as: (1) Determining when the interests at stake weigh in favor of 
barring claims due to lapse of time, and (2) Providing defendants with peace of 
mind). 
184 See Frankel & Forrest, supra note 14, at 302–04 (noting that the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that “decisions based on statutes of limitations are 
decisions on the merits”) (emphasis in original). 
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have become increasingly stale and sketchy, as well as chains of 
title that have become progressively convoluted with the passage 
of time.185 
HEAR, however, turns this objective on its head, insofar as it 
is premised on the fact that because the Holocaust occurred long 
ago, claims in U.S. courts for Nazi-appropriated art should be 
exempt from statutes of limitation.186  HEAR’s sui generis 
limitations period tolls only when a claimant had actual 
knowledge of the current location of a work, and not at the point 
when a claimant might reasonably be expected to act on 
information made available to him.187 
In her discussion of the potential use of temporal defenses in 
Holocaust-era art claims, and the equitable defense of laches 
particularly, Alexandra Minkovich has argued that good-faith 
purchasers who assert this defense “are innocent parties who 
risk losing possession of a work for which they gave valuable 
consideration and to which they believed they had valid title.”188  
Paradoxically, Minkovich notes that the growing resources of 
information about the theft and movement of artworks during 
the Holocaust, should make laches defenses more viable as 
dilatory plaintiffs may more readily be perceived as having “slept 
on their rights.”189  Minkovich also observes that: “[c]ourts may 
find the policy of returning property stolen by the Nazis to its 
original owners less compelling when the plaintiff is several 
generations removed from the original owner, never knew the 
original owner, and has no connection with the stolen 
property.”190 
 
 
 
185 See id. 
186 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 2(6) (“Those seeking recovery of 
Nazi-confiscated art must painstakingly piece together their cases from a 
fragmentary historical record . . . .”). On the other hand, Allen Gerson a former State 
Department official, has claimed that Russia is deliberately attempting to capitalize 
on the fact that claims weaken over time by suppressing information about its vast 
caches of Nazi-looted art that were shipped from Germany to Russia at the end of 
WWII. See Allan Gerson, Opinion, Guarding its Loot, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/opinion/22iht-edgerson.1.10305450.html.   
187 See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 5. 
188 Alexandra Minkovich, The Successful Use of Laches in World War II-Era Art 
Theft Disputes: It’s Only a Matter of Time, 27 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 349, 350 (2004). 
189 See id. at 351. 
190 Id. at 381. 
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HEAR is also problematic in that it was motivated by 
judicial dispositions of claims for restitution of art works that are 
now owned by public institutions.191  Given the complexity of 
many claims hitherto against museums, for artworks displaced, 
transferred, or stolen during the Holocaust, it is worth 
considering whether HEAR will likely promote more equitable 
and socially desirable dispositions of such disputes. 
III. PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC MUSEUMS, AND  
HOLOCAUST-ERA CLAIMS 
A. Museums as Targets of Holocaust-era Restitution Claims 
Most of the claims asserted in the United States relating to 
artwork displaced during WWII have been against public 
museums or other non-profit organizations, and the U.S. or state 
governments.192  Museums are attractive targets for such claims 
for the obvious reason that they deal primarily with works of art.  
Ironically, they are also attractive targets because many have 
made significant efforts responding to initiatives like the 
Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, to 
identify publicly all works in their inventories that changed 
ownership during WWII.193 
Public museums are not only “where the art is” but also, 
ultimately from the claimants’ perspective, “where the money is.”  
Claimants routinely profess that their claims are motivated by a 
desire to seek justice for persecuted relatives—commonly long 
deceased—or by sentimental attachment to works of art with 
 
191 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
192 See Stephen Clark, World War II Restitution Cases, ALI – ABA COURSE OF 
STUDY; LEGAL ISSUES IN MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION (2009) (identifying thirty-two 
claims against U.S. museums, eleven against other U.S. defendants, and thirty-five 
against foreign museums). See also Resolved Stolen Art Claims, HERRICK FEINSTEIN 
(2015), http://www.herrick.com/content/uploads/2016/01/2baf90026004c362078b75e 
cab983961.pdfIn 2009 (last visited Nov. 7, 2018) (illustrating that thirty-one of fifty-
two U.S. claims listed were lodged against museums; the percentage of claims that 
have been made against European museums versus private parties is considerably 
higher). 
193 See Press Release, Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated 
Art, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 3, 1998) (available at https://www.state.gov/ 
p/eur/rt/hlcst/270431.htm) (last visited Nov. 7, 2018) (released in connection with the 
Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets, Washington DC, Dec. 3, 1998). 
One hundred and seventy-nine American museums have contributed documentation 
on Holocaust Era works in their collections to The Nazi-Era Provenance Internet 
Portal (http://www.nepip.org/) maintained by the American Alliance of Museums. 
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which they had little or no acquaintance earlier in their lives.194  
However, many, if not most of the works that have been turned 
over by museums and governments to these claimants have been 
subsequently sold to the highest bidder, and the works disappear 
from museum collections into the hands of private collectors.195  
Most likely, some then migrate to storage vaults in Switzerland 
or the Cayman Islands where they are seen by no one, like 
precious metals stored in darkness by owners anticipating 
appreciation over time.196 
In some cases, museums have simply paid successful 
claimants the estimated market value of a work to retain 
ownership of it.197  This is a desirable approach in so far as it 
reduces transaction costs and leaves the work in the public 
sphere.  Unwarranted “buy backs,” however, siphon resources 
from, and thereby debilitate, public museums, particularly those 
with relatively modest financial reserves whose primary assets 
are works of art often acquired by bequest. 
This was the case, for instance, in the disposition of the 
claim to a well-known portrait by Egon Schiele owned by 
Austria’s Leopold Museum.  In 2010, a decade after District 
Attorney Robert Morgenthau’s widely disapproved seizure of the 
portrait while the Leopold was lending it to New York’s Museum 
of Modern Art,198 the Leopold paid $19 million to the heirs of an 
 
194 See, e.g., SIMON GOODMAN, THE ORPHEUS CLOCK: THE SEARCH FOR MY 
FAMILY’S ART TREASURES STOLEN BY THE NAZIS 317 (2015) (discussing his 
acquisition of valuable artworks, including works in public museums—most which 
he then sold—once owned by his grandfather, in connection with his status as a 
particular child designated “as a ‘memorial candle’: one who took on the mission of 
preserving the past and connecting to the future”). 
195 See generally Michael Kimmelman, Klimts Go to Market; Museums Hold 
Their Breath, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at E1 (discussing how claimants who 
successfully obtained Klimts from the Austrian government sold one of the works for 
$135 million). 
196 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR 
RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS 222–225 (2003) (discussing how claimants who 
successfully obtained Matisse’s Odalisque from the Seattle Art Museum immediately 
sold it to casino mogul Steve Wynn who then sold it to a company in the Grand 
Cayman Islands, whence it was ultimately shipped to Switzerland for an unknown 
buyer). 
197 See Carol Vogel, A Schiele Going, a Schiele Staying, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 
2011, at C28. 
198 See Robert Hughes et al., Hold Those Paintings! The Manhattan D.A. Seizes 
Alleged Nazi Loot, TIME, Jan. 19, 1998 (suggesting that Robert Morganthau’s 
conduct was the result of politicking by former Republican Senator Alfonse D’Amato 
who was seeking Jewish support during an election year, for a bill on Holocaust Era 
property restitution). 
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early owner of the work.199  To cover this payment, whether 
restitution or ransom, as well as over $4 million of legal fees, the 
museum was compelled to de-accession other works in its 
collection.200 
B. Holocaust-era Artwork Claims and the Perception of a 
“Holocaust Industry” 
In his controversial book, The Holocaust Industry, Norman 
Finkelstein claims that  a cadre of lawyers, politicians, and 
leaders of several Jewish organizations have coopted the 
Holocaust and used it as a cudgel to extort assets from 
Switzerland, Germany, and Austria.201  According to Finkelstein, 
negligible portions of the assets they obtained have benefited 
Holocaust survivors.202  Most ended up in the hands of a few 
prominent Jewish organizations, and extravagantly compensated 
lawyers.203 
Only a minute segment of the European Jewish population 
that was decimated during the Holocaust owned Swiss bank 
accounts, life insurance policies, and works by Klimt and 
Schiele.204  During WWII, wealthy Jewish families tended to fare 
better than middle class and poor families who lacked the assets 
and influence that made it easier to escape the worst Nazi 
 
199 See Vogel, supra note 197. 
200 Id. 
201 See NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, THE HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE EXPLOITATION OF JEWISH SUFFERING 86–139 (2000). See Omer Bartov, A Tale of 
Two Holocausts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/06/ 
books/a-tale-of-two-holocausts.html (deeming Finkelstein’s book “an ideological 
fanatic’s view of other people’s opportunism, by a writer so reckless and ruthless in 
his attacks that he is prepared to defend his own enemies . . . .”); Roger Cohen, Book 
Calling Holocaust a Shakedown Starts a German Storm, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/08/world/book-calling-holocaust-a-shakedown-
starts-a-german-storm.html.  
202 See FINKELSTEIN, supra note 201, at 81, 83–88, 106–07, 123. 
203 See id. at 81–102, 104–10, 114–24, 131–36, 138–39. Finkelstein’s doubts 
regarding Melvyn Weiss’s ethics were borne out when Weiss was imprisoned and 
disbarred for racketeering in connection with his class-action practice. See Jonathan 
D. Glater, Class-Action Lawyer Gets 30 Months in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, 
at C3. See also Charles Krauthammer, The Holocaust Scandal, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 
1998 (“[T]he only thing certain to come out of this grotesque scramble for money is a 
revival of Shylockian stereotypes.”). 
204 See BAZYLER, supra note 196, at 287 (quoting Anti-Defamation League 
leader Abraham Foxman’s remarks that restitution litigation “trivialized the 
Holocaust . . . and made it to be that Jews didn’t die because they were Jews but 
because they had Monets, Swiss bank accounts, Stradivarius violins. The fact is that 
a tiny, tiny, tiny, tiny, tiny, percentage had Swiss bank accounts.”). 
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persecution.205  Unsurprisingly, offspring of these families of 
ordinary means are disconcerted by claimants who have 
garnered enormous financial windfalls in part by invoking the 
genocide of millions of Jews, most of the descendants of whom 
obtained nothing.206 
C. Museums and Public Interest 
Works of art are among the least fungible forms of moveable 
property.  Artworks’ uniqueness generates greater emotional 
bonds between them and their individual or collective owners 
than those that exist between owners and fungible assets like 
cash or insurance policies. 
When an artwork enters the collection of a public museum, 
its prestige and financial worth increase because the public 
values not only the work itself, but also the museum’s 
imprimatur of connoisseurship.  Because the public generates 
value, it also, over time, develops an affinity with the work and  
 
 
 
 
 
205 Peter Tammes, Survival of Jews During the Holocaust: The Importance of 
Different Types of Social Resources, 36 INT’L J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 330, 331–32 
(2007); Yoav Ben-Shlomo & Zeev Ben-Shlomo, Commentary: From Links to Bonds—
What Factors Determined the Survival of Jews During the Holocaust?, 36 INT’L J. OF 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 335, 335 (2007). 
206 See BAZYLER, supra note 196, at 272 (observing that many Holocaust 
survivors are livid when they hear the claim that “the entire Jewish people are the 
heirs of survivors,” and one survivor’s reaction to the tactics of organizations like the 
World Jewish Congress: “How dare these institutions presume to spend ‘restituted’ 
funds for their favored ‘philanthropic’ projects . . . using money claimed from the 
most terrorized victims of the past century?”); Sir Norman Rosenthal, Editorial, The 
Time Has Come for a Statute of Limitations, ART NEWSPAPER, Dec. 2008, at 30 (on 
file with the author); see also Ulrike Knofel, A Question of Morality: An End to 
Restitution of Nazi Looted Art?, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 9, 2009), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,618400,00.html (discussing 
Norman Rosenthal's opposition to restitution); SPIEGEL Interview with British Art 
Expert: "We Must Live in the Present," SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 9, 2009), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,618399,00.html (interviewing 
Norman Rosenthal regarding his controversial opposition to the return of art stolen 
by the Nazis). But see Catherine Hickley, Germany Rejects Call for End to 
Restitution of Nazi-Looted Art, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2009), 
https://www.lootedart.com/news.php?r=NKTO1A333041 (quoting German Culture 
Minister Bernd Neumann's statement that the German government remains 
committed to restitution despite Norman Rosenthal's Der Spiegel interview). 
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thereby acquires interest akin to ownership of it.207  This is why 
museums’ attempts to de-accession works to generate funds, even 
to survive, are typically met with vociferous opposition.208 
The import of the public’s contribution to the prestige of 
cultural artifacts was implicated in the outcome of Maria 
Altmann’s recent claim against Austria for five Klimt paintings.  
Altmann’s aunt Adele, the original owner, and subject of the 
most famous of the five works, unequivocally wished the 
paintings to be ultimately, and permanently, displayed for the 
public’s enjoyment in the State Museum in Vienna.209  If Altmann 
had prosecuted her claim—the subject of a fanciful recounting in 
a recent feature film produced by Harvey Weinstein210—against a 
private collector or dealer who kept these works out of public  
 
 
 
 
 
207 See Frankel & Forrest, supra note 14, at 298. (“Claimant-museum 
relationships are not bilateral. They are triangular, with the public providing the 
third point of consideration.”). In most cases the public also indirectly pays, through 
admission fees and taxes, for the maintenance of the collection and the museum. 
208 See, e.g., Robin Pogrebin, A Chastised Museum Returns to Life, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 17, 2011, at C1. (discussing sanctions imposed by the American Association of 
Art Museum Directors on the National Academy Museum and School in New York, 
which sold two paintings to extricate itself from dire financial straits); Daniel Grant, 
Is the University’s Museum Just a Rose to be Plucked?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2009 
(noting the outraged response to Brandeis University’s plans to sell artworks from 
its Rose Museum in order to address rising operating costs and a plunging 
endowment in the wake of the Bernie Madoff scandal). Public opinion can also impel 
the sale or removal of artworks. See Liam Stack, Here’s Lucy! ‘Scary’ Statue is 
Replaced With One that Looks Like Her, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2016, at A17; Grace 
Glueck, What Part Should the Public Play in Choosing Public Art?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
3, 1985 (discussing public outcry over Richard Serra’s “Tilted Arc”, which was 
ultimately removed from a public plaza in lower Manhattan). 
209 See Will of Adele Bloch-Bauer (Jan. 18, 1923) (on file with author). 
210 See Ramin Setoodeh, ‘Woman in Gold’ Premieres in New York without Harvey 
Weinstein, VARIETY (March 31, 2015), http://variety.com/2015/scene/vpage/woman-
in-gold-premieres-in-new-york-without-harvey-weinstein-1201463354/. Woman in 
Gold (2015) received mostly tepid reviews, in part because of its ham-handed, one-
dimensional presentation of a complex dispute of ambiguous merit. See Tim Robey, 
Woman in Gold Review: ‘Distinctly Ordinary’, THE TELEGRAPH, April 9, 2015 
(“Prime opportunities are missed here to explore the conundrum, controversy and 
morality of the art restitution struggle, especially in the way it conflicted here with 
Adele’s own dying wishes: that the painting stay put.”); Peter Debruge, Film Review: 
“Woman in Gold”, VARIETY, Feb. 9, 2015 (“Nuance is nowhere to be found… and 
though a certain audience won’t object to being forced how to feel, there’s a 
monumental issue at stake here that the film scarcely acknowledges: Does (or 
should) anyone really own art?”). 
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sight, we would be less perturbed by the outcome of the dispute 
in which Altmann sought the greatest possible monetary profit 
by selling all five paintings to private parties.211 
This outcome was lamentable, however, because the works 
were taken from a museum whose location and admiring public 
had, over decades, generated much of the paintings’ significance 
and economic value.212  When Altmann sold the paintings, a 
handful of distant heirs, private buyers, and lawyers arrogated 
and liquidated this public investment and appreciation.213  Today, 
of the five Klimts, only the painting purchased by Ronald Lauder 
is in the permanent collection of a museum open to the public, 
the Neue Galerie in New York.214 
Museums have been extraordinarily accommodating of 
claims to Holocaust-era works in their collections.215  
Descendants of Holocaust victims have lodged most of these 
claims, although the governments of Italy and Poland have 
asserted claims as well.216  For instance, in 2010, Italy claimed a 
Renaissance-era work, then in Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts 
(“MFA”), had been looted during WWII from the premises of a  
 
 
 
211 See Kimmelman, supra note 195, at E1 (noting that by briefly lending the 
paintings to the Los Angeles County Museum of Art and Ronald Lauder’s Neue 
Galerie, Altmann garnered “presale publicity of a sort that no auction house could 
organize”). In other words, after obtaining the five paintings from Vienna’s 
Belvedere Museum, Altmann also capitalized on the imprimatur and repute of 
public museums in the United States to boost the prestige and, ultimately, sale 
prices of the works. Ronald Lauder participated in this strategic plan when he paid 
$135 million—the highest sum ever paid for a painting—for Portrait of Adele, 
thereby priming the pump for the later sale at auction of the remaining four 
pictures. See Carol Vogel, Lauder Pays $135 Million, a Record, for a Klimt Portrait, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2006, at E7. 
212 See Kimmelman, supra note 195, at E1. 
213 Such investment and ownership is akin to what Herbert Lazarow identifies 
as the “endowment effect” underlying statutes of limitations: “It has been observed 
that people will demand more to sell property that they own than they will pay to 
acquire the same property. [That] [a]ttachment to property grows as the period of 
possession lengthens.” Lazerow, supra note 40, at 225. 
214 See About the Collection, NEUE GALERIE, https://www.neuegalerie.org/ 
collection/about-the-collection. Unlike similarly specialized collections, which are 
typically public charities governed by boards of trustees, the Neue Galerie is a 
private foundation that Ronald Lauder established and controls. Id. 
215 See Frankel & Forrest, supra note 14, at 329–35 (listing thirty-two claims 
since 1998 in which museums either relinquished the claimed works to the 
claimants, or kept them after negotiating financial settlements with the claimants). 
216 See id. at 329–34. 
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small museum in Trento.217  After investigating the claim, the 
MFA—which acquired the work in good faith in 1946 from an 
Italian dealer no less—returned it to the Trento museum.218 
Legitimate institutional claims that result in a museum’s 
forfeit of a disputed work—like that involving the Boston and 
Trento museums—raise fewer ethical misgivings than do claims 
against museums made by private parties like Marei von Saher 
and Maria Altmann.  This is true because when a work is 
transferred between two public institutions, the cultural and 
economic value generated by the public is not lost, or usurped by 
a private party. 
This is true also because the more attenuated the 
relationship between private complainants and original owners 
of purportedly stolen works, the less sympathetic we are to their 
claims, particularly those lodged against public resources.219  
With public/institutional claimants, on the other hand, the 
passage of time does not necessarily diminish public sympathy 
for the claims, and might even augment it.220 
Let us suppose that privately owned real property 
confiscated by the Nazis in the 1930s was acquired in good faith 
in the 1970s.  The good-faith buyer subsequently donates the 
property to establish a public park.  His gift has positively 
affected the lives of thousands over the past forty years—a 
positive outcome from the wake of a terrible era.  Imagine too, 
that a well-heeled heir of the family whose property had been 
confiscated asserts a claim to it, or its cash value, decades after 
the property has been used to effect a public good.  Regardless of 
the legal basis of the claim, it is ethically fraught if capitulating 
to the claim would debilitate or eradicate a public resource that 
has enhanced the lives of many, to benefit an individual with a 
tenuous association with the resource. 
 
217 See id. at 334. 
218 See id. at 326. 
219 See, e.g., Complaint, at ¶¶ 1, 5, Michael Hulton et al. v. Bavarian State 
Paintings Collections et al., No. 16-cv-9360 (RJS), 2016 WL 4757949 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
5, 2016). Recently the great nephew of an erstwhile owner of eight paintings filed a 
claim in a U.S. district court against the Bavarian State Museum, based on 
speculation about how the museum may have obtained the works. Id. 
220 For example, public sympathy for Greece’s claim to the Parthenon Marbles 
owned by the British Museum has waxed in recent years to the extent that today 
even many citizens of Great Britain believe that the works should be returned to 
Athens. See Trevor Timpson, Stephen Fry’s Parthenon Marbles Plea Backed in 
Debate Vote, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-18373312. 
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Therefore, the identity of the defendant in a restitution claim 
influences our perception of its legitimacy.  Claimants against 
museums, however, may regard such institutional defendants 
along the lines of storehouses of fungible properties, like banks, 
rather than stewards of unique artworks held in public trusts.  
For instance, Eric Simon, who is hostile to the interests of the 
museum founded by his grandfather, has suggested in connection 
with Von Saher’s claim: “The choice should be an easy one: 
replace the two paintings on the wall of the museum with two of 
many works of art kept indefinitely in storage, or be singled out 
as an apologist for Nazi art theft.”221 
This suggestion reflects an insidious notion that art 
museums should readily capitulate to restitution claims simply 
to avoid negative publicity, or even scandalous insinuations of 
anti-Semitism within their managerial ranks.222  One 
commentator has noted how this threat has affected museums’ 
handling of restitution claims: 
When the [provenance] record is less clear, museums often 
return a claimed work, even if they do not fully believe that the 
claimant is entitled to it. Thus, a critic of one of the most well-
known restitution specialists, Clemens Toussaint, has said that 
“[h]is restitution tactics are almost like blackmail because 
museums are so afraid of the bad publicity, they feel they have 
no choice.”223  
In most cases, museums have negotiated directly with claimants, 
partly to avert negative publicity, even if baseless, that 
invariably attaches to simply being named a defendant in such a 
lawsuit.224  And these settlements have typically resulted in the 
museum giving the work, or its cash value, to the claimant.225 
 
221 Mike Boehm, Simon Family Member Chides Museum, Grandson Urges the 
Institution to be ‘Just’ with ‘Adam’ and ‘Eve’, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-et-cm-norton-simon-grandson-
20141113-story.html. 
222 It also runs counter to a general policy that is hostile to de-accessioning 
works in public institutions. See Robin Pogrebin, A Chastised Museum Returns to 
Life, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 2011.  
223 Erin L. Thompson, Cultural Losses and Cultural Gains: Ethical Dilemmas in 
WWII-Looted Art Repatriation Claims Against Public Institutions, 33 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 407, 427 (2011). 
224 See id. at 432. 
225 See Stephen K. Urice, Elizabeth Taylor’s Van Gogh: An Alternative Route to 
Restitution of Holocaust Art?, 22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 8 
(2011) (noting that only a handful of Holocaust art claims have been lodged against 
private parties, and fewer than half of these were settled). 
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CONCLUSION 
In Francofonia, Alexander Sokurov’s phantasmagorical 
contemplation on the migration of cultural works, the film 
director laconically observes that significant works of art are 
destined to migrate and settle where war brings them.226  Many 
recent efforts that attempt to reverse the consequences of this 
ineluctable movement, including claims by attenuated heirs for 
works looted by Nazis that are now in public museums, imply 
philosopher Max Weber’s “theodicy of disprivilege.”227  As Michael 
Roth explains in his review of David Rieff’s recent In Praise of 
Forgetting, this is 
[T]he belief that salvation comes to those who’ve suffered most.  
Who has endured more, Jews or Palestinians? Or is it African-
Americans?  The sordid competition among groups for beatitude 
through traumatization has become a fact of American cultural 
life. 228 
Only those who directly suffered at the hands of the Nazis may 
comprehend the pain and loss inflicted on Jews and other 
minorities during the Holocaust.  But this is true of the 
consequences of any genocidal or monstrously unjust political 
regime.  Accordingly, the more attenuated the relationship 
between those who actually suffered persecution, and 
downstream claimants of their confiscated property, the more 
likely such claims appear to have questionable grounds. They 
may be perceived to be motivated less from the preservation of 
memory as a “nourishing connectivity,” and more as a means to 
financial windfalls and, in Roth’s words, “the perpetuation of 
resentment and the desire for revenge.”229 
Accordingly, perhaps the most problematic aspect of HEAR, 
and hortatory proclamations like the Washington Conference 
Principles on Confiscated Art and the Terezin Declaration, lies in 
their according heirs the same moral and legal standing as direct 
 
226 See generally FRANCOPHONIA (Idéale Audience 2015). Much of the film deals 
with the parlous state during WWII of the Louvre’s collection, which, ironically, 
contains a great number of works acquired as loot (“spoils of war”), particularly 
during the Napoleonic era. 
227 See MAX WEBER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 113 (Ephraim Fischoff trans., 
Beacon Press, 4th ed. 1993) (1963). 
228 Michael S. Roth, Don’t Speak, Memory, WALL ST. J., (June 26, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/dont-speak-memory-1466975713?ns=prod/accounts-wsj. 
229 See id. 
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victims of Nazi persecution and predation.230  Because most of 
these victims who survived the Holocaust are now deceased, the 
end result of initiatives like HEAR may be to benefit a few 
claimants—and their contingency-fee lawyers—who neither 
directly suffered at the hands of the Nazis, nor worked to acquire 
the artworks the Nazis looted from their forbears. 
Legislative carve-outs like HEAR privilege a narrow segment 
of a particular class of living descendants from victims of a 
particular appalling injustice.  But a vast number of living 
individuals are ultimately descended from ancestors persecuted 
and robbed during one or another violent and unjust regime, e.g.: 
Great Britain’s genocide of over two million Irish in the 1840s;231 
Stalin’s extermination of millions of Russians and Ukrainians in 
the 1930s;232 Hirohito’s massacre of millions of Chinese and 
Koreans during WWII;233 Castro’s violation of human and private 
property rights in the early 1960s.234  While descendants of other 
once-victimized populations may pursue legislative preferential 
treatment like HEAR, such efforts that enable so few to benefit 
so handsomely risk tarnishing the collective remembrance of 
barbarities that affected millions. 
HEAR asserts that its prohibition of time-based defenses for 
Holocaust-era art claims is necessary because it is only now, 
seventy-five years after the Holocaust, that some claimants have 
located works or information indicating that an ancestor who was 
persecuted during the Holocaust may have once owned an 
 
230 See generally Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 
114-308 [HR 6130], 130 Stat. 1524, 1525 (2016); Terezin Declaration, HOLOCAUST 
ERA ASSETS CONF. (Jun. 30, 2009), http://www.holocausteraassets.eu/program/ 
conference-proceedings/declarations/; Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-
Confiscated Art, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ¶¶ 5, 7, 8, 9 (Dec. 3, 1998), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm. 
231 See EMER O’SULLIVAN, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF WILDE 43 (2016) (noting 
that Ireland was forced, during the Great Famine, to export to Britain great 
quantities of food produced in Ireland that would have been sufficient to feed the 
Irish population). 
232 See generally NORMAN M. NAIMARK, STALIN’S GENOCIDES (2010) 
(documenting Stalin’s killing of untold millions by violent and indirect means like 
orchestrated famine). 
233 See, e.g., IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST 
OF WORLD WAR II 4 (1997). RUDOLPH J. RUMMEL, STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE: 
GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER SINCE 1900 32 (1998). 
234 See Alistair Bell, Despite Detente, Search for Art Looted in Cuba Could Take 
Years, REUTERS ENTERTAINMENT NEWS, (Jan. 7, 2015), http://in.reuters.com/ 
article/cuba-usa-art-idINKBN0KG0EH20150107 (discussing Cuban government’s 
confiscation and sale of privately owned art and other property). 
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object.235  But it is also true that the passage of time has rendered 
claimants more attenuated from the actual victims.  Moreover, 
many works that have been claimed have surfaced in museums 
that acquired them legally, and have made them available to the 
public long after the deaths of those who owned them before the 
Holocaust. 
Our perception of the ethicality of an art restitution claim, 
therefore, depends in part on attributes of both the claimant and 
the defendant.  Accordingly, we would almost certainly be 
sympathetic to claims by actual victims of the Nazis against 
dealers who knowingly trafficked in, and profited from, artworks 
stolen from them.  Likewise, the positive perception of museums’ 
recoveries of works privately owned—like the National Museum 
of Warsaw’s recovery of the Geldorp portrait purchased in good 
faith by a private party—is enhanced by the ensuing public 
benefit.236  By the same token, we are less sympathetic to claims 
lodged by second or third-generation descendants against public 
museums that acquired in good faith once-confiscated works that 
have already been subject to legitimate restitution proceedings. 
Exemptions from temporal defenses may be reasonable 
insofar as they may allow claimaints to hold accountable 
dealerships and auction houses that knowingly capitalized upon 
the poisoned fruits of Nazi injustice.  Museums that are public 
charities, however, which believe they have good title to a 
claimed work, should not be prevented from using temporal 
defenses to avoid devolutions to jury trials and inappurtenant 
campaigns to influence public opinion. 
 
 
235 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 2(6). 
236 See supra Introduction. 
